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It is hard to appreciate the true significance of the compromise that saved the EU’s
budget (MFF) and its post-pandemic recovery fund (NextGenEU) from the veto of
two member states that are famous for flaunting the Union’s founding values.
The price of lifting the veto: adding a few conditions to the draft regulation on
budgetary conditionality, settled already in November 2020 between the Council and
the Parliament. These additional conditions – worded in a mix of diplomatic language
and legal references – were inserted in the Council’s conclusions. Admittedly, the
legal force of these Council conclusions is questionable, even if they are likely
to trigger legal consequences. Despite the animated criticism these conditions
prompted, to a less informed, impartial observer they look rather harmless: there
is a promise that the new regulation on conditionality will be applied in line with
widely-accepted premises of EU law (and not for a political vendetta) and there is a
confirmation of access to a standard legal challenge (annulment action before the
Court of Justice) against the legal binding elements of the compromise. This does
not sound revolutionary, to say the least. So why does this matter?
1. Proof that the Rule of Law is a Empty Phrase in
the EU
The terms of the compromise – and especially the terms of the draft regulation –
confirm that there is not much to the rule of law in the EU after all the energy that
was put into defending it during the last decade.
First, in November 2020 the process for imposing budgetary conditionality was
turned into a multi-step inter-institutional dialogue, i.e. the very format that Hungary
and Poland learned to master over the years: They know how to use it to their
political advantage, but also how to sow conflict between EU institutions while doing
so. So far the only constitutional actor that has managed to stay above the fray is the
Court of Justice (CJEU).
Second, the premises of withdrawing EU funds, set forth in the draft regulation have
become tentative and fuzzy in the course of the trialogue. Conditionality will kick in
if “breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a Member State affect or seriously
risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the protection of
the financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way” (Article 3).
Recall that the budgetary conditionality is the consequence of practical difficulties
with applying Article 7 TFEU. Article 7 TFEU asked for identifying the ‘clear risk of a
serious breach’ of the founding value of the Union. To be able to say that a particular
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behaviour (even when the facts are not disputed) ‘affects’ a subject in a ‘sufficiently
direct way’ requires a series of discretionary decisions along rather unclear and
imprecise terms. It is exactly the type of legal drafting that runs counter to the basic
premises of the rule of law, emphasizing clarity, foreseeability and anti-arbitrariness.
It is a serious achievement on Hungary’s and Poland’s part to drive EU institutions
so far into mocking the rule of law in the spirit of defending it. Then again, this is
exactly what illiberal constitutional engineering is about: using familiar constitutional
and legal techniques for ends that subvert constitutionalism and the rule of law.
2. Drag the CJEU Into the Mud Pit
The genius of the December compromise is that it encourages member states to
drag the CJEU into the middle of this debacle. The legal terms of this enterprise
have already been explored on this blog in intricate detail.
It is crucial, however, to recall the practical wisdom of doing so. After all, in recent
years the CJEU found both Poland and Hungary in violation of EU law for pet
projects that violated the founding values. The point is not that all of a sudden
Poland and Hungary trust the CJEU. Rather: they have found the perfect pretext and
opportunity to engage it in a conflict where they will find allies across the EU.
This happens in a climate where courts are routinely attacked for engaging in
‘political justice’, and even the friends of judicial independence suggest packing
courts (as Democrats did in the US to counter Trump appointees). The clashes (or
almost clashes) European top courts have had in recent years with the CJEU (the
Weiss saga being only recent example) create perfect opportunities for creating new
alliances against juristocracy – in the name of defending democracy with a flavour of
national constitutional identity. This course of action will reignite the conversation on
legal pluralism – all the while pulverising the supremacy of EU law.
At a minimum, this forecast is meant to put the CJEU on notice, in case it were
to rule against the member states challenging the future terms of budgetary
conditionality. Such techniques of intimidation are regularly used on the national
level to great success. The CJEU will only be reminded that it is not immune to the
Zeitgeist that is suspicious of judicial supremacy.
3. Beyond Rule of Law – on to Human Rights
With the ideal of the rule of law lethally wounded (if not obliterated) and the CJEU
put on notice, it is time to move to the next level.
In the past few months both Poland and Hungary turned up the volume on their
public campaigns in defense of Christian values and illiberal Christian democracy.
These themes will gain new significance when – after the rule of law debacle –
efforts to defend the founding values of the Union will concentrate on human rights,
equality and non-discrimination.
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Going after women’s rights and LGBT rights, attacking ‘gender ideology’ and
defending the traditional family are familiar themes. The rhetorical gesture of
withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention may soon be exhausted, thus, the culture
wars will turn to other ways of defending women’s rights, or at least their health. The
Geneva Consensus Declaration on women’s health and the family was cosponsored
by Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Uganda and the United States. This global
alliance attests the wide-ranging appeal of these ideas.
At the same time, to prepare the (back)ground for recasting human rights,
considerable efforts are being made to undermine the stature of the European
Court of Human Rights (i.e. the body where many EU institutions look for human
rights standards), sometimes in unorthodox ways. It looked odd when in the fall a
former chief justice of the Hungarian Supreme Court, Zoltán Lomnici (who is now
the president of the Council of Human Dignity) was complaining in the Hungarian
press that his letter exposing the Soros network that has captured the workings of
the ECtHR was left without a response by President Spano. This ‘scandal’ follows
on the tails of the report that the European Center for Law and Justice conducted on
Soros influence at the ECtHR (published in French in Valuers actuelles), followed
more recently by a similar report on the Soros-influence at the Council of Europe. In
a familiar style, ad hominem attacks on particular judges call attention to judgments
that allegedly encroach upon European and / or Christian values.
Those who point out that in more recent years the CJEU started developing its
Charter jurisprudence in terms that depart from ECtHR case law (on migrants’ rights,
NGOs and academic freedom), shall also note that the CJEU most likely earned its
special mention in the Council conclusion in part due to these judgments.
4. Hold on to the Money
While Hungary and Poland managed to successfully move attention away from
their violations of the rule of law, they ultimately also succeeded in preventing the
development a robust EU mechanism that would stop funding the clientelistic-
oligarchic reproduction of illiberal regimes in the EU.
Academic literature has amply demonstrated how EU funding (whether in a member
state or outside) strengthens the position of the executive branch, and assists
dominant local parties – backing the executive – in winning re-election through
regular elections. In short: EU funding becomes the fuel of illiberal regimes.
According to the literature on conditionality, sanctions (and conditions) have to be
credible to make a difference.
Budgetary conditionality in its current form certainly does not present a credible
sanction. Existing anti-fraud and anti-corruption mechanisms (even when they work)
target incidental cases, and not the form of systemic corruption that the clientelistic-
oligarchic reproduction of illiberal regimes presents.
With rule of law pulverized, the instinctive reaction will be to activate human rights
conditionality for EU funding.
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At first this looks like a promising avenue: when Polish cities declared themselves
to be LGBT free zones, it triggered a withdrawal of EU funds for their twinning
projects aimed to promote “opportunities for mutual understanding, intercultural
learning solidarity, societal engagement and volunteering at Union level” with
grants up to 25,000 EUR. Note that the Polish Justice Minister objected in the fine
language of EU values, submitting that “The Union must respect the equality of all
its citizens, who have the right to form their opinions and beliefs freely.” In response,
the Commission confirmed on the highest level its support for the rejection of EU
funding. In a statement President von der Leyen said: “Our treaties ensure that every
person in Europe is free to be who they are, live where they like, love who they want,
and aim as high as they want.” She added: “I will continue to push for a Union of
equality.”
The concerted efforts of Poland and Hungary to push attention away from how
EU money is spent and towards discussing European – and especially Christian –
values is an effort to redefine the Europe where we live and love. Theirs is not an
effort to settle at a cozy illiberal or authoritarian equilibrium, but to redefine the terms
and frames of mainstream politics in Europe – and ultimately, the shape of the Union
itself. On December 10, 2020 they made considerable advances to this effect, and
the consequences of their efforts should not be underestimated.
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